Abstract. In this paper, we extend the understanding of versioning strategy of an information goods monopolist and provide new insights on when versioning is optimal. To do so, we derive the optimal product line or versions of an information good and the corresponding prices. By relaxing common assumptions on consumers' usage costs, versioning costs and capital research and development costs, we provide new insights as well as reconcile extant findings on versioning. For a good with no-free-disposal (NFD), i.e., one where consumers have usage costs, our results show that a monopolist's marginal cost and consumers' usage costs have the same impact on its versioning strategy, and that these factors are the sole reason for optimality of versioning of information goods. By endogenizing the production of the highest-quality, we show that capital costs create a downward distortion of quality even for the highest types in the market even under full information. Presence of separate versioning costs also lowers the qualities served to the high types and reduces the segment of consumers who are served with product versions. However, versioning costs do not affect market coverage or the price-quality menu itself. Further, when some of the consumer usage costs are absorbed by the firm (as in case of cloud-based provisioning), it does not necessarily lead to market expansion.
Introduction
Early research in economics has studied feature-differentiated product line and pricing decisions of physical or industrial goods vendors, often called vertical differentiation or quality segmentation models (Mussa and Rosen 1978) . Along these lines, in the last two decades, quality-based differentiation for information goods or digital products has received significant attention where such product line strategies are called versioning (Varian 1997) . Usually, the idea behind such a strategy is to create the highest version of a product and then create degraded versions or versions with less features or functionality by removing, disabling, or recombining functions from the flagship product (Wei and Nault 2014) . Shapiro and Varian (2013) identify many dimensions along which information goods versioning is pursued including delay, access, features, functions, and quality and suggest that information goods vendors "design the high-end product first, then remove features to make the low-end version" (p. 69).
Although the context in which versioning is studied is wide and varied, in this body of literature one major theme that emerges is the interest in factors that influence/determine the versioning decision of a firm. These works include Bhargava and Choudhary (2008) , who study a monopoly that seeks to segment the market by introducing additional lowerquality versions of its existing product; Chen and Seshadri (2007) , who examine versioning when consumers have type-dependent reservation utilities; and Wei and Nault (2014) , who examine versioning in the presence of group tastes among consumers. Many others Shivendu 2005, Lahiri and Dey 2013) have studied how presence of piracy impacts the decision to do versioning. More recent works (August et al. 2014, Niculescu and Wu 2014) have investigated software versioning through feature-limited freemium models and software as a service model. While these models provide a rich base from which to examine versioning, there are several other factors hitherto not examined in literature that may potentially affect versioning decisions. We identify four such factors and describe them in the following subsections. One of our major research goals is to examine the role of each of these factors in the firm's versioning decision.
Costs of Information Goods Production
and Consumption The factors of interest to us can be grouped under "costs," some of which may be incurred by the producer while others may be incurred by the consumer in enjoying the information good. While some elements of the former have been examined in literature, the latter has largely been ignored.
Consumer's Usage Costs (No Free Disposal).
Many models in economics that employ utility functions generally assume a free disposal property (MasColell 1992 , Mas-Colell et al. 1995 implying that for the same price consumers will weakly prefer more of the good. Utility functions in extant work on versioning also embody this nonsatiation property, and these functions are monotonic (often linear, or concave and increasing) in quality or features. However, for many information goods and services this assumption does not capture reality, e.g., Microsoft's operating systems and software are sometimes referred to as bloatware, as they are often packed with excessive features or functionalities. For these products, more is not necessarily better because software consumption is intrinsically associated with memory usage; hence, at some point the diminishing return from additional features is overtaken by the increasing cost of using them. Such excess can be a particularly severe problem for mobile operating systems where handsets and touchpads have limited capacity and memory. While Microsoft's Windows Mobile OS has always suffered from this criticism, more recently it has been reported that bloatware has crept into Google's Android OS as well (Milian 2010) . Generally, this aspect of software consumption has been ignored with the exception of one work on software bundling that recognizes this possibility, such as when some consumers may find no value for addins and possibly even incur a penalty cost (Dewan and Freimer 2003) .
Recent research points out how utility from personalization services are also nonmonotonic (concave) in services due to the built-in disutility from privacy costs (Chellappa and Shivendu 2010) . Personalization services are infeasible without sharing of personal/preference information, which gives rise to privacy concerns. Hence, consumers are known to only prefer a subset of the services offered, even if they may be free. Indeed, the assumption of free disposal is increasingly being questioned in the case of information goods and services, "Unlike physical goods for which 'free disposal' is always an option and more is, in general, always better, service delivery is intrinsically participatory. Participation requires time commitment and physical effort on the part of consumers. Thus, there is no free disposal for service" (Essegaier et al. 2002, p. 151) . However, there is little or scant research on mechanism design for goods with no-freedisposal (NFD) in both economics and IS research. Specifically, we do not know how these costs suffered by the consumer will impact versioning and other product line decisions.
Development Costs of Highest Quality Version.
Extant research on information goods has ignored the impact of initial development costs on versioning; either it assumes that features or functionalities can be developed costlessly (and therefore can create a product of infinite quality), or it has explicitly stated that "fixed costs of developing the highest quality are sunk, and the highest available quality is exogenously specified" (Bhargava and Choudhary 2008, p. 1029) . In the information goods context, one recent work (Jones and Mendelson 2011) considers development costs, but this does not impact the monopolist's versioning strategy. In the model setup of one other work (Wei and Nault 2013) , the authors include a cost function for the production of the highest quality version, but they do not solve for the optimal menu, nor do they explicitly derive the highest quality produced. Therefore, they are not able to comment on the optimality of versioning as a strategy but they observe that "from this analysis it is clear that the quality of the high quality version depends on the convexity of development costs" (p. 500).
In this regard, there is also a work (Hahn 2000) in the physical goods quality segmentation literature that examines the impact of initial fixed costs of developing the highest quality good, although the firm also suffers a marginal cost of serving each consumer. Our work follows this line of reasoning for information goods and allows for the reconciliation of the impact of production cost (suffered by the firm) and usage cost (suffered by the consumer).
Versioning Costs.
Since the cost of copying software or other digital goods is virtually zero, and as degradation often just involves the disabling (or noninclusion of) a subset of functions or features, prior research has generally examined versioning decisions taking versioning costs to be zero (Chen and Seshadri 2007) . Sometimes there is simply no mention of these costs, and these are absorbed into marginal costs. However, versioning costs are distinct and different from marginal costs of production and depend upon the size of the market segment served with type-customized versions. This is particularly true when each version needs to be marketed/promoted separately and/or when they require a separate post-sales service investments. We can frequently observe this for software that is targeted toward different segments such as students, home use, small-business use, professional, enterprise, etc., all of which might require distinct sales channels. In other words, net versioning costs may not be all electronic in nature, thus eschewing the common benefits of digitization. In this work, we would like to understand whether versioning is optimal when costs of versioning are considered and if so, the market segment to whom type-customized versions should be served. Downloaded from informs.org by [170.140.104 .2] on 10 March 2017, at 06:38 . For personal use only, all rights reserved.
Shifting of Usage Costs from Consumers to
Firm Due to Cloud Hosting. Firms may reduce the usage costs incurred by their consumers by serving them the software using cloud technology. This implies that the firms now have to incur an additional cost of hosting and serving the software to the consumers. Due to this architecture, the capacity utilization of the machines at the consumer end is reduced, thus reducing their usage costs and increasing their utility from consumption. Therefore, an interesting question is whether such cloud technology would enable the firm to serve the lower end of the market. Further, we would like to know whether the firm can serve the higher end of the market with higher quality.
Optimality of a Monopolist's Versioning
Strategy in Literature As discussed earlier, literature suggests that the optimality of versioning strategy (as opposed to offering a single version of the product) for a monopolist may depend on a number of possible factors. These factors are typically context specific. For example, in Bhargava and Choudhary (2008) the presence of positive marginal costs that increase with quality of the version and certain distributional properties are required for versioning, whereas in Chen and Seshadri (2007) marginal costs are positive but independent of the quality of the version, yet versioning is found to be optimal. So, a natural question to ask is whether the cause of versioning is fundamentally different as the context changes, or is there an underlying reason that is common across different contexts where versioning is observed. An answer to this question will help develop a holistic and context independent understanding of versioning. This is the second major goal of the research in our paper.
In Section 2 we introduce a general model developed along the lines of a standard monopolistic screening model (Laffont and Martimort 2001) , from which we not only examine the impact of NFD and initial development costs but can also relate to extant results. In this section we first examine the full information case as the results are not obvious; these results will serve as a benchmark for later comparison with information asymmetry results. In Section 3 we analyze the mechanism under information asymmetry where the firm develops a menu for self-selection by the consumers. We conclude with theoretical and managerial observations in Section 4.
Model
The standard vertical differentiation model of quality is the inspiration for our base model formulation. There is a rich literature on vertical segmentation that exclusively uses the term quality differentiation or vertical differentiation; however, in the information goods literature, in addition to quality, terms such as versions, features, and functionality are also interchangeably used. Versioning itself is more formally defined by Varian (1997, p. 190) , "[W]e will focus on a particular aspect of differential pricing known as quality discrimination or versioning. These terms describe situations in which the producer provides different qualities/versions of a good which sell at different prices." He further goes on to note that "If we think of quality as being 'additional features,' an admittedly dangerous equivalence, this means that the producer should add features until the willingness to pay for an additional feature by the high end of the market just equals the cost of providing that feature. Once the high end has been determined, the producer then removes features to sell to the lower segment of the market, recognizing that feature it removes allows it to increase the price sold to the high WTP consumers." Similarly Wei and Nault (2013) use the term functionality in their model, e.g., "degraded versions-versions with less functionality." Generally, a product is considered to be an economic bundle of infinitesimally small features or functionalities such that as more features/functions are added, the product becomes of higher quality. Formally, our model consists of a principal-a digital goods firm with a unique production cost structure and agents-consumers who face resource constraints in consuming these goods. Let q: q ∈ + such that higher q implies a good of higher quality. The firm may costlessly damage its product of qualityq to any lower quality q ∈ [0,q] by "by removing, disabling or recombining functions" (Wei and Nault 2013, p. 495) . Along the lines of Mussa and Rosen (1978) and others in the versioning literature (Varian 1997 , Sundararajan 2004 , Bhargava and Choudhary 2008 , consumers are indexed with their marginal value for quality θ ∈ [θ,θ] which is distributed with density function f (θ) and cumulative density F(θ) that is continuously differentiable. Further, f (θ) is assumed to be single-peaked (unimodal) and is everywhere positive on its support such that its hazard function h(θ) f (θ)/F(θ), satisfies the monotone hazard rate property. The sufficient condition for this distribution requirement is satisfied by most parametric single-peak densities (Bagnoli and Bergstrom 2005) , and the assumption is a fairly standard one in models of price discrimination (Sundararajan 2004) .
To consume the product, the consumers also incur a resource cost. For example, this might be due to the average memory consumed to run each software feature, and we consider a market that is homogeneous in its resource-cost coefficient given by a parameter λ (λ > 0). Therefore, the utility for consuming a Downloaded from informs.org by [170.140.104 .2] on 10 March 2017, at 06:38 . For personal use only, all rights reserved.
product with quality q priced at p (p ∈ + ) for a consumer with index θ is
Observe that the utility function is nonmonotonic in quality, i.e., up to a point (utility maximizing quality) the utility is increasing in quality, and then it decreases. In other words, there is no free disposal in quality; higher quality can actually make the consumer worse off. 1 We have adopted a specific functional form of the utility function which is standard in the extant literature 2 on vertical differentiation (Mussa and Rosen 1978) and no-free disposal (Chellappa and Shivendu 2005) . For brevity, henceforth we refer to U(θ, q, p) as U(θ) only. Note that in our model the consumers do not face any budget constraints.
Another aspect of our model is that the firm has to decide on the highest quality it must produce along with any versioning and pricing decisions. To endogenize this decision, we incorporate a fixed, qualitydependent cost of creating the highest quality. We assume this cost to be convex in quality and given by cq 2 . This convex cost function is commonly assumed for information goods, since it is generally believed that most cost-effective decisions are made first, and it becomes increasingly costly to improve quality by adding features to information goods (Jones and Mendelson 2011) . Empirical research in software engineering also finds this cost to be convex, although there are some differences in the degree of convexity (Boehm et al. 2000) . This fixed cost is a one-time investment in creating the highest quality, a kind of research and development (R&D) investment. Once this list of features is created, the firm can create versions of the good. Here, we assume versioning costs to be zero (aka costless damaging), although we specifically relax this assumption later to delineate the differential impact of versioning costs and marginal costs of production. Similarly, we also assume the marginal costs to be negligible at this time, i.e., firms can serve additional consumers for free once a version is created; however, note that we also revisit this cost in the section where the firm adopts a cloud-based model of product provisioning.
A general understanding of versioning strategies is provided by a mechanism design approach under information asymmetry. While this is a common starting point for most literature on versioning, we also provide a brief review of the full information case results (that is often left out because it is considered trivial). Full information results require a revisit in our paper, as there is a potential for full information strategies to be different from extant models of versioning under first-degree discrimination because of the presence of consumer usage costs and endogenization of the maximum quality decision.
Full Information Versioning Strategies
(Welfare Maximizing Solution) The timeline for the model is as follows: The vendor invests in research and development to create the highest quality product. Using this highest quality, he can create other reduced quality versions of the product and set their prices accordingly. It is costless for the vendor to create additional versions of reduced quality (zero versioning costs), and he does not incur any additional costs in serving consumers (zero marginal cost). To determine this highest quality level, the vendor considers his next stage decision of versions and corresponding prices and then employs backward induction.
In the full information case, the vendor knows each consumer's type; hence, he will extract the maximum surplus possible from each type. Note that the solution to this problem is the same as a welfare-maximizing solution but one where the vendor extracts all the surplus. Letq be the highest quality level that is produced by the vendor and q(θ) be the quality offered to each consumer of type θ. Note that our utility function is nonmonotonic concave, i.e., each consumer has a satiation point at which he derives maximum benefit from consumption. This utility function is maximized at
and the corresponding price to extract the full surplus can be obtained from
implying that the optimal price p * (θ) θ 2 /(4λ). It is very simple to observe that even if the vendor had no cost of creating the highest quality, there is no point in creating a quality greater thanθ/(2λ), as this is the quality at which the highest type in the market derives maximum benefit from consumption.
However, when there is a cost associated with quality production, we do not know if the vendor may even be able to supply this quality to the market. Asq is the highest quality level, the consumer type for whom surplus is maximized at this quality isθ 2λq, wherê θ ∈ [θ,θ]. Since (∂/∂θ)(q * (θ)) > 0, this implies that consumer types θ ∈ (θ,θ] will be served qualityq that is less than their first-best (i.e., utility maximizing) quality. The corresponding price to extract full surplus from these consumers is p * (θ) θq − λq 2 ; therefore, the objective function of the vendor can be expressed as Solving the maximization problem in (2) by Fubini's theorem and pointwise maximization (details are in the appendix), and usingθ * andq * to represent optimal values, we have the following lemma.
All proofs are in the appendix. The properties of the above results make for interesting analyses. If c 0 the solution to the above Equation (2) isθ * θ ; i.e., all consumers will get the utility maximizing individualized version (q * (θ)) and the highest quality that will be produced isθ/(2λ). However, if c > 0, thenθ * <θ since G(θ) is an increasing superlinear function of θ; i.e., consumers with index greater thanθ * are served with qualityq, which is less than their utility maximizing quality. Therefore, the size of the consumer segment that is served with type-customized versions is reduced in the latter case compared to the situation where c 0. In other words, as long as the vendor has some finite cost of creating the initial quality, he will not offer the first-best quality to the highest types in the market even under full information.
Note that if both λ 0 and c 0, we do not get interior solutions. This should be fairly obvious in that if the consumers' utility is strictly increasing in features and there is no cost to producing them, then an infinite quality/price would be the solution for all consumer types. Indeed, even when λ 0 and for some positive value of c, the solution will be to create the highest possible quality and serve the same quality to all types but at different prices. While we use a stylized quadratic utility function, using any other functional form such as a higher-order polynomial does not distract from the discussion. The key difference will be that a higher-order polynomial represents lower surplus per consumer for each quality level; the surplus maximizing quality and the break-even qualities will be lower for a given type. Now, we examine the role of different cost factors on versioning in Section 3, in the context of information asymmetry, i.e., when the firm does not know the marginal value for quality of an individual consumer.
Versioning Strategies Under Information Asymmetry
When the vendor cannot perfectly price discriminate between consumer types, it must develop a menu of truth-revealing versions and prices such that the consumers self-select the version targeted at them. In this case, the vendor only knows of the distribution of the types but not the type of a particular consumer. Similar to the full information case, the vendor has to decide the highest quality that he will produce and the subsequent versions that he will create for the market. In determining his prices, he may have to pay information rent to high types so that they do not buy a lower quality version. Suppose if the vendor creates some maximum quality, q H , the corresponding profit maximization problem for the firm, along with the respective individual rationality (IR) and incentive compatibility (IC) constraints is
where U θ (θ) represents the utility of the consumer of type θ if she misrepresents her type asθ. The incentive compatibility condition essentially states that a consumer prefers the price-quality meant for him because the utility from that pair is higher than provided by any other price-quality pair. Hence, it must be that
Similarly, for a consumer of typeθ, it must be true that declaring herself to be of type θ would result in lower utility for her, i.e., we need that
The formulation of the two IC constraints above ensures that the consumer picks a version that is targeted to that consumer, i.e., there is no cannibalization in the demand of a version. Equations (4) and (5) further lead us to understand that any optimal versioning menu, if one exists, needs to be nondecreasing in consumer types (proof is in the appendix), i.e.,
This gives us Lemma 2. 
Lemma 2. The index of the lowest consumer type who is
Lemma 2 and Proposition 1 are intermediate results in that we do not yet know what the optimal highest quality (q * H q(θ * H )) produced should be. First, note that the monopolist delineates the market into three distinct segments where he does not serve a portion of the market given by type θ ∈ [θ, θ * L ). While this is consistent with extant segmentation models for physical goods (with marginal costs of production) where some low types get left out of the market, this result is not that intuitive for information goods; note that the monopolist does not suffer any cost of serving the low types in the market. In other words, he could have costlessly served this segment and potentially extracted a surplus equal to
, and yet he finds it optimal not to do so. The economic rationale behind this decision stems from the information rent that he has to pay to higher types whenever a product of lower quality-price is offered to deter the high-types from purchasing a lowquality product. The monopolist considers the trade-off between the revenue (as there are no costs) from these low types and the net rent he has to pay to high types if he serves the low types and decides not to serve the segment given by θ ∈ [θ, θ * L ) at all. He also develops a nonlinear menu for a segment given by θ ∈ [θ * L , θ * H ) where each consumer gets a version q(θ) corresponding to his type. We can easily see that this quality menu is decreasing in λ meaning that with increasing usage-related costs, each consumer type's quality is lowered. For the consumer segment defined by θ ∈ [θ * H ,θ], the firm offers a single product. In extant segmentation models, the lowest type (θ) under asymmetry is either not served at all or receives a lower quality than in the full information case. However, the highest type (θ) should generally get the same quality as in the full information case. Therefore, to solve for the complete quality-price schedule, we first solve for the maximum quality level the firm will produce. Taking into account that the utility for the lowest served type (θ * L ) must be zero because the firm extracts full surplus from such a consumer (see the appendix for more details), we can write the expression for p(θ) as
Note that the first two terms of the price expression above represent the full surplus of the consumer (price in the full information case). However, the third term is negative and represents the information rent that must be paid by the firm because it does not know the type of a given consumer. Substituting for p(θ) and incorporating the appropriate limits for the integral, we can now rewrite the objective function given in Equation (3) as
where 
Lemma 3 provides us the lowest high-type consumer who will receive the highest quality produced. We can now compare this highest quality that will be developed under information asymmetry with the welfare-maximizing or full information solution given by Lemma 1. This comparison is given in Proposition 2, which also points to quality distortion for the high types.
Proposition 2. The highest quality under information asymmetry is lower than the highest quality produced under full information (q * > q * H ). Further, the optimal schedule of quality under information asymmetry is also lower for every consumer.
Traditionally, under information asymmetry, the monopolist serves the same quality to the highest customer type as it would under the full information case. In other words, there is no distortion at the highest quality level under information asymmetry, and generally it is the lower consumer types who are served with degraded quality (Srinagesh and Bradburd 1989) . Even though the highest type receives the same quality under both full and asymmetric information cases, the price she pays in the latter case is lower (due to information rent). In this regard, a recent unpublished thesis on physical goods (Hahn 2000) with a standard utility function and a finite marginal cost of production also finds quality distortion for all consumer types. When it comes to information goods, the single version result of Jones and Mendelson (2011) also alludes to this reduction in quality. However, our finding of quality distortion is much richer in the understanding it provides and is very general in its applicability. The Downloaded from informs.org by [170.140.104 .2] on 10 March 2017, at 06:38 . For personal use only, all rights reserved. Jones and Mendelson (2011) work finds that only one quality of information good is provided to the market and this quality is downward distorted; in other words, all served consumers get that same lower quality. Our finding shows that quality distortion is only for the high types, which is the interesting and counter-tointuition result for information goods. We show that while the low types are not served, the middle types receive personalized quality (not distorted) and the high types get a bunched solution that not only leads to their getting a uniform quality but is also distorted downward.
Now we introduce Figure 1 to provide a visual comparison of quality menus under full and imperfect information. Note from Figure 1 that the versioning menu is concave in consumer types under information asymmetry, while it is linear in the full information case. Also note that the figure depicts only the case whereθ * < θ * H , although the converse is also possible (see the proof of Proposition 2 for further discussion). We find that the monopolist divides the market into three segments, with the lowest segment not being served, the highest segment being served with a single product, and the mid segment being served with versions in accordance with their marginal value for quality.
Further, the quality and price for consumers in the mid segment increases with their type but at a decreasing rate. While the magnitude of the quality served in the menu depends on the nature of the distribution of consumers, we find that the existence of this versioning strategy is independent of the distribution of consumer types. Note that in some other extant models of versioning, either explicit assumptions on market coverage are introduced in the model setup or only two consumer types are considered; in the latter, if versioning is pursued, then market is always covered. In our 
case, as a result of deriving the full versioning-menu for a general distribution, we endogenize any market coverage decision. Consider the case of Microsoft Office 2010. Microsoft offers a fairly low-end option in a Starter edition followed by Home and Student, Home and Business, Standard, Professional, Professional Academic, and finally a Professional Plus. Even though there are firms that seek and are willing to pay for more features, they have to make do with the highest version (Professional Plus) that is offered. Evidence of this fact is commonly seen in Microsoft's technical forums 3 where not only needs for unmet features are expressed but solutions in the form of either workarounds or third-party vendors offering such features are present. This is an example of a situation where there exist some high types whose optimal qualities are higher than what the firm provides.
We can further understand market coverage though comparative statics of the size of various market segments derived in the model with respect to costs c and λ.
Proposition 3. The segment of consumers that are served with type-customized versions is decreasing in the development costs c but is increasing in the usage costs λ. Market coverage is independent of both these parameters.
Proposition 3 succinctly captures the differential impact of the initial development cost and the usage cost on versioning providing key insights into market coverage and versioning as a strategy. 4 Consider the comparative statics of θ * L with respect to the two costs; θ * L refers to the lowest consumer type who would be offered a version, and from Lemma 2 we can see that this boundary is independent of either cost parameters. In other words, under information asymmetry, market coverage when versioning is optimal is purely a function of the distribution. The market is covered if and only ifθ ≥ 1/ f (θ). In the full information case, however, the market is always covered with the types lower thanθ * receiving their first-best quality. Now consider the comparative statics ofθ * and θ * H ; we can see that both these bounds are decreasing in c but are increasing in λ. θ * H refers to the highest consumer type who will be served a personalized version (second-best quality 5 ) under information asymmetry, whileθ * represents such consumer type (who gets her first-best quality) under full information. Not surprisingly, these bounds are decreasing in the development cost c as it plays a role in the production of the highest quality that corresponds to the personalized version of θ * H . However, it might be somewhat surprising to note that these bounds are increasing in the consumer's usage cost λ, also implying that more people get their second-best quality as usage costs increase. This can be Downloaded from informs.org by [170.140.104 .2] on 10 March 2017, at 06:38 . For personal use only, all rights reserved. explained as follows: The first implication of increasing usage costs is that the optimal quality served to each consumer is lowered. Therefore, for a given highest product quality, the interval of consumer types who get served their second-best quality increases. However, a second implication of increasing usage costs is that the surplus of each consumer reduces. This implies that the market is less valuable for the firm, resulting in the creation of a lowered highest-quality, and consequently fewer consumers get served their second-best quality. The result in Proposition 3 establishes that the impact of the first implication dominates, and so overall more consumers are served their second-best quality.
Impact of Versioning Costs
The difference between versioning and marginal costs is generally not captured in many extant models on information goods versioning. Versioning costs can indeed be distinct and separate even for information goods that may have zero marginal costs of production. Often, these costs are due to specific marketing activities and related investments incurred in managing a segment of consumers for whom a particular version is created. For example, in the context of software, Microsoft Office will have to incur packaging, marketing, and customer service costs that may be distinct and different for the different versions it creates. Often referred to as segment development costs (Dhebar 1990 ), even for a digital good, these may include nondigital elements. This is not the cost of serving each additional customer but rather this is the investment made when a separate version is created.
The versioning cost is often ignored and is either assumed away in information goods literature when "negligible marginal costs" form the core of the model or is not differentiated from marginal costs. In fact, just as optimality of versioning is of interest, another element of relevance is the monopolist's decision with regard to the segment of consumer to whom product versions are to be offered. Many extant models consider only two consumer types that make it difficult to separate the decision on the optimality of versioning from the decision on the consumer segment that is served with the versions. This understanding becomes relevant and important particularly when versioning costs differ from marginal costs. Therefore, in this section we introduce a separate versioning cost, a onetime investment for each version that is created, and we rewrite the firm's objective function in Equation (3) as
where k is the cost-coefficient for each version of the information good that is created. 
Proposition 4. Versioning cost does not affect market coverage nor does it influence the quality schedule, however this cost lowers the highest quality developed in the market and reduces the segment of consumer types who are served typecustomized versions.
Proposition 4 tells us that even with the presence of an additional cost of creating versions, the firm will continue to serve the same market as before. We can see from the proof that θ * L with versioning costs is the same as what we have seen before in Lemma 3; since everyone to the right of this consumer is served, the market coverage is the same. In fact, it will also offer the same quality menu in the market except that the segment of consumers receiving their type-specific quality reduces, i.e., θ * H (no versioning costs) > θ * H (with versioning costs). Therefore, more high types now receive the same version, also known as a bunched contract.
Note that our motivation for examining versioning costs was to separate its influence from that of marginal costs, and it is very evident from Proposition 4 that the impacts of these costs are indeed different. For information goods, the relevance of this cost is directly related to the density of the distribution-if there is only one customer of each type, then essentially we can speak of the marginal costs and versioning costs in the same breath as in effect the cost of serving each consumer is the cost of the version itself. However, when there are multiple consumers for each type then each consumer type essentially forms a segment and the firm may incur a marginal cost to serve each consumer in such a segment, whereas the versioning cost is a onetime cost of the developing the version for the whole segment.
Cloud-Based Provisioning of NFD Goods
The technological nature of usage costs to the consumers is such that it can be partially transferred elsewhere such as through cloud-based models of computing. While there are supply-side discussions about Downloaded from informs.org by [170.140.104 .2] on 10 March 2017, at 06:38 . For personal use only, all rights reserved.
migrating to the cloud, such as trading off infrastructure investments that are amortized over a period versus incurring operational expenditure (CAPEX versus OPEX), there is little to no academic research on the specific advantages of moving to the cloud for NFD goods where opportunities for some cost transfer exist. Here we specifically wish to explore the implications of moving to software-as-a-service or cloud-type models when there are intrinsic consumption-related costs that could potentially be shared by the vendor.
New technologies, such as those employed in cloud computing, are developed on client-server principles where the amount of work done on the client end can be reduced through virtualization and other technologies. In other words, processing that would normally be done on a client like a mobile device can possibly be accomplished on servers in a cloud implying that the burden of usage can be now partially borne by the firm that has invested in the cloud technology. Therefore, some disutility associated with memory and/or processing power consumption is reduced for the consumer, as it is now performed on the cloud. To capture this reduction in disutility, we introduce a parameter d ∈ [0, 1] such that provisioning through the cloud allows the consumer to enjoy utility of the form
. A larger d implies that more and more processing is virtualized.
However, this virtualization on the cloud is not costless, and cloud infrastructure providers charge vendors for this provisioning. While multiple types of tariff relationships are possible, we consider a simple tariff structure where the vendor pays the cloud infrastructure provider on the basis of every feature-consumer served. This implies that pricing is based on both the size of the consumer segment as well as the quality offered to the consumers. We introduce a parameter δ(δ > 0) that captures any cloudification costs. Therefore, we can rewrite the objective function of the vendor considering cloud-based provisioning as
(10) Note that marginal cost suffered by the firm in this case is not a traditional cost of production, but it specifically suffers the cost itself to alleviate it for the consumers. Since a firm might be able to better manage this aspect, it is not a one-to-one alleviation, i.e., the cost reduction on the consumer side is not simply added on the vendor side. Results from optimizing the objective function given in Equation (10) is described in Proposition 5.
Proposition 5. When the firm absorbs a portion of consumers' usage costs e.g., through cloud-based provisioning he will reduce market coverage leaving more low-type consumers unserved. The firm will improve the quality offered to high types if the cloud technology sufficiently lowers relative to cloudification costs consumer specific usage costs.
We started with the premise that "cloudification" requires some transfer payment to a cloud vendor while it promises to reduce the computing burden on the user end. Our results show that any such payment will automatically reduce market coverage where some low types will not be served under the cloud model. Therefore, our results suggest that we cannot always assume that movement to a cloud-type technology will always result in greater participation.
Not surprisingly, our results also suggest that any benefit in the form of higher quality that can accrue to the high types is possible only if the migration to the cloud results in substantial reduction in usage-related disutility. The cloudification costs themselves will push the vendor to target more of the high types forcing him to serve individualized qualities to these consumers, i.e., θ * H (noncloud) < θ * H (with cloud model). However, whether or not the consumers who are served a menu will get a higher quality under the cloud provision, i.e., whether q(θ) under the cloud model will be greater or lower, is a function of the relative values of δ and d.
There are some key theoretical understandings here, primarily the finding that lowered costs from cloudification are not passed on to the low-end consumers. In other words, the market coverage actually reducesmore low-types are left unserved (or lesser lower-end versions are offered), and the firm focuses on providing more value to the high-types and extracting that surplus. While this may be surprising at a first glance, what we are essentially observing is the fact that monopoly considerations trump any cost benefit from cloud migration.
Indeed, there are other aspects to migrating to a cloud, but in this model we are specifically interested in the transfer of the usage burden to the cloud. The goal of this section is not to account for all possible elements of cloud-based provisioning but to really compare versioning under product-provisioning with cloud-based provisioning. It is for this reason we have considered the same market described in the earlier non-cloud-based offerings. A truly cloud-based model will perhaps need to examine other elements of usage, e.g., temporal changes in user demand. As opposed to installed software products, it is possible to enjoy cloud-provisioning on an on-demand basis, thus allowing for a very different pricing and tariff structure. Even in current offerings, we observe that pricing is offered at different levels of granularity, e.g., Microsoft Office 365 does not allow for on-demand pricing, while Amazon's AWS allows for more granular options. Our current setup is more in line with the former scenario. Having derived different quality schedules under setups that include both extant and new factors affecting versioning, we have an opportunity to understand and reconcile differing observations on information goods versioning. So, in the following section, we further generalize our model with the sole intention of separating out the factor(s) that makes versioning optimal for a monopolist.
When Is Versioning Optimal?
The industrial goods literature has shown that, when consumers differ in their preferences for quality, segmentation of consumers based on quality is an attractive strategy. The benefit of this strategy comes from the fact that creating an individual, type-specific good generates the highest consumer surplus, which can then be extracted by the firm to maximize its profits. In the case of information goods, it would appear that versioning should be even more attractive than in industrial goods because of the possibility of costless degradation of such goods to create multiple versions. While this may be case, some works on information goods suggest that versioning is suboptimal, while some others suggest that versioning is optimal. As a result of our in-depth analyses of the various costs involved in information goods versioning, in this section we are able to not only reconcile these apparently conflicting observations but also provide a holistic understanding of versioning.
We shall, therefore, begin by examining, from the information goods literature, the purported causes of versioning. In a seminal work, Bhargava and Choudhary (2008) observe about one of their propositions that "the choice of versioning strategy depends on how the low-and high-type consumers vary in their relative valuations for low-and high-quality products" (p. 1031). Further, they also note that this proposition, "provides a precise quantifiable measure of the degree of consumer heterogeneity needed to make versioning optimal." In other words, they suggest that the optimality of versioning depends on consumer heterogeneity, i.e., distribution of their types. Similarly, Jones and Mendelson (2011) claim that "for information goods, the losses from cannibalization always outweigh the benefits of segmentation" (p. 166). They go on to suggest that the reason for this suboptimality of versioning is due to specific distributional assumptions such as, "consumers are distributed over an interval starting from zero, and we do not assume that the market is completely covered" (p. 166). In other words, this paper also suggests that some property of the distribution is the source of versioning.
Finally, a more recent paper has succinctly summarized the extant observations on information goods versioning and pointed out that the prevalent view is indeed that consumer type distributions and optimality of versioning are somehow related. August et al. (2014) write about previous literature saying that (p. 493), "In this literature, a common point of concern is that when consumers are heterogeneous in their taste for quality and this taste parameter is uniformly distributed, a software vendor will not find it optimal to version its product." To provide a holistic understanding of versioning that is fairly context independent, we develop the following result without assuming a functional form for the utility and a general distribution. Proposition 6 is critical to reconciliation of results from extant models discussed before, and this proposition is true under both the case of full information and information asymmetry; we shall largely discuss the latter here since it is more general. This proposition states that marginal usage costs (an example of no-free-disposal) and production costs (generally discussed in industrial goods literature) are duals in that their impact on all firm decisions including versioning, pricing, segmentation, and profit are the same even if one appears to impact the consumer and the other affects the producer. This proposition also states that the presence of such a marginal cost (or any other factor that has a similar role) is a necessary and sufficient condition for versioning. Moreover, Proposition 6 finds that whether versioning is optimal or not is independent of consumers' type distribution bar common regularity assumptions described earlier.
For the proof of Proposition 6, we first consider a general model without specifying a functional form for the utility function and without any distributional assumptions (bar standard regularity conditions) and proceed to develop the full solution space; we then impose specific assumptions from extant models that correspond to various cost parameters to identify the source of versioning in each of these models. We consider a general utility function of the form u(θ, q) − p where the goal of the monopolistic firm is to design a price schedule {q(θ), p(θ)} to maximize its profit. Since the monopolist does not know which consumer is what type (information asymmetry), he has to design the menu or quality-price schedule to be truth-revealing, i.e., consumers must self-select into the intended quality-price based on their type. We show that to develop a menu where at least two different θ types get two different qualities, it is necessary and sufficient that either consumers' utility function itself is strictly concave, i.e., u(θ, q) < 0 or/and if u(θ, q) is monotonically increasing concave or linear, the marginal cost c(q) suffered Downloaded from informs.org by [170.140.104 .2] on 10 March 2017, at 06:38 . For personal use only, all rights reserved.
by the firm be strictly convex, i.e., c(q) > 0. In other words, the proof of the proposition shows the need for a marginal cost factor for the optimality of versioning.
We shall now discuss this generalized result for the specific utility function discussed in the paper. While there is no prior work that has examined nofree-disposal through usage costs and a nonmonotonic utility function (case with positive λ (λ > 0)), we can easily accommodate many extant models through suitable assumptions of our generalized model. For example, if we consider λ 0 and maintain the development cost, we get the setup suggested by Jones and Mendelson (2011) -strictly multiplicative monotonic utility with convex initial development cost and zero marginal (and versioning) costs. Our results for this setup will find that the monopolist will offer a single version (with quality distortion); versioning will be suboptimal, and these will be consistent with the aforementioned paper. However, our Proposition 6 shows that this result is independent of the distributional properties or consumer heterogeneity, while Jones and Mendelson (2011, p. 166) attribute the single product result to distributional assumptions (quoted earlier in this section). In other words, the aforementioned paper suggests that some property of the distribution is the source of versioning; however, in reality the work has no marginal cost and hence no versioning. Further, we can also show that the quality distortion in this paper is not present for all served consumers but restricted to the highest type consumers. A similar observation can be made about the findings of Bhargava and Choudhary (2008) in that their versioning result is due to the presence of a marginal cost and not due to distributional aspects.
On the other hand, consider a case where λ is positive with no initial development costs. We can easily see that this leads to a versioning menu but without any distortion in quality for the high types; i.e., all consumers who are served receive their second-best quality. Collectively, these observations tell us that while the capital cost is responsible for quality distortion for the high types, the usage cost is responsible for the versioning decision. Now, consider a physical good equivalent with the traditional multiplicative monotonic utility with convex initial development cost and a positive qualitydependent marginal cost, and where the vendor suffers a marginal cost to serve each consumer. Proposition 6 tells us that this will yield the same versioning strategy as the one for goods with no free disposal. It is interesting to note that even though the vendor suffers the cost in this case, he will offer the same menu, thus reconciling with a recent physical goods segmentation result (Hahn 2000) . Further examination of the surplus per consumer makes the economic intuition behind this apparent; irrespective of who suffers the cost, the vendor maximizes the net surplus per consumer, then pays the corresponding rent (to ensure incentive compatibility) and extracts the remainder through price. Therefore, it does not matter if the loss from consuming a good of a certain quality is through the nofree-disposal property of the consumer or from the marginal production costs to the vendor.
We can see that the only time a menu is derived as a strategy is when there is an interior solution to the term inside the integrand in Equation (11). (11) is concave in q(θ). Note that this is always true in the case of goods with no free disposal, or when there is a convex marginal cost such as for physical goods. In other words, we can categorically prove that versioning is optimal only in the presence of usage costs or marginal costs of production. Extant utility functions (increasing and multiplicative) considered in information goods (i.e., where marginal costs are zero) literature can never lead to optimality of versioning.
Conclusions
Our work builds upon a vast literature on physical goods quality segmentation and information goods versioning to accommodate hitherto un-included factors such as consumers' usage costs and development costs of the highest version. The motivation for our work is twofold: on the one hand we are interested in realistically capturing the impact of different types of costs such as no-free-disposal, versioning costs, and cost of quality development; while on the other hand, we wish to examine the theoretical underpinning of versioning decisions. Many information goods, in particular software, are consumed through mobile devices such as smartphones and tablets. One cannot enjoy these information goods without them consuming resources such as memory and processing power. Our work draws attention to this fact and suggests that awareness of this consumption-related disutility is critical to feature bundling. Hence, product managers need to be aware that more is not necessarily better and one cannot always expect higher featured product to be strictly preferable to low quality products. However, our results also point to the fact that this disutility is critical and useful as an instrument for consumer segmentation. This explains why we continue to see most software offered in multiple versions, while strictly zero-marginal cost information goods vendors should really find versioning suboptimal.
Further, as opposed to extant work on information goods that often considers versioning decisions separately from product development, we consider them simultaneously. Results from this analysis tell us that Downloaded from informs.org by [170.140.104 .2] on 10 March 2017, at 06:38 . For personal use only, all rights reserved. firms need not produce the highest-possible quality for the highest-type consumer in the market. Such a result is counter to the prevailing notion that quality be maximized and surplus be extracted through price. Further, our observation that highest types in the market should be served one quality while lower types get their individualized quality is also an uncommon result and stems from our ability to endogenize highest quality development.
From a managerial viewpoint, differentiating versioning costs from marginal costs is an important contribution in that it clearly tells a product designer that creating multiple versions where each version may have associated costs can actually be detrimental to high types in the market. In other words, an increase in versioning costs reduces the segment of high types who get a custom feature-set. Finally, technological advancements in cloud-based delivery are a fairly attractive way of provisioning software; our results suggest that this may not necessarily be accompanied by market expansion, and that the tariff structure of the cloud vendor plays a large role. In fact, if the payment is such that the firm pays the cloud vendor for every feature-consumer served, then the market may indeed contract. The final contribution of this work is that it categorically identifies marginal cost (or usage cost) as the sole reason for optimality of versioning.
All our findings are fairly general even though we use a specific form of the utility function for the consumer. The generalizability of our results is showcased from the analysis conducted for Proposition 6, where we relaxed the assumption of the specific form of the utility function. We observed that the main insights from our results that the lower end of the market remains uncovered, the existence of the menu for the mid-segment of the market and the top-quality distortion for the upper end of the market remains the same. 
Appendix. Table of Notations and Proofs of Lemmas and Propositions

Proof of Lemma 1
Using the analysis in Section 2.1 for the pricing and quality offered to the consumers, Equation (2) can be rewritten as
After integrating by parts and simplifying the above expression becomes
∫ θ θ G(z) dz, the above expression can be further simplified to
We represent the above expression by the symbol E, and con-
The first-order condition can, therefore, be expressed as
Thus, E is strictly concave inθ, and so an internal solution is possible. Also, note that at c 0, the expressionθ −θ G(θ) − G(θ) + cθ/λ reduces toθ −θ G(θ) − G(θ). It is easy to see thatθ * θ is a solution to this equation. Further, no other value of θ can be a solution toθ, since that can happen only when G(θ) is a linear function of θ. This would imply F(θ) 1, or that all probability is a mass at one point and there is no distribution of consumers. Since this is not the case, we conclude that θ * θ is the unique solution toθ −θ G(θ) − G(θ). Also note that dE/dθ| c>0,θ θ < dE/dθ| c 0,θ θ ∀ θ. Thus, it must be thatθ * | c>0 <θ * | c 0 . Thus, the solution toθ −θ G(θ) − G(θ) + cθ/λ is unique and internal. Sinceθ * <θ, the implication is that consumers with θ >θ * do not receive their most efficient quality. Further, all these consumers are served with the qualityθ * /(2λ). The remaining consumers with θ ∈ [θ,θ * ] are served their most efficient quality, since the firm maximizes the consumers' surplus and then fully extracts that surplus to maximize its profits.
Proof of Lemma 2 and Proposition 1
The optimization problem for the vendor is given by We first focus on the IC condition. Suppose the vendor offers a quality/feature-price schedule {q(θ), p(θ)} for every type θ. To make sure that the consumers self-select into buying the appropriate version, it must be that each consumer maximizes her surplus by truthfully revealing her type θ. In other words, the consumers' incentive compatibility constraints (ICs) must be satisfied. We represent the utility of a consumer of type θ who declares her type to beθ as U θ (θ). Hence, it must be that U θ (θ) ≥ U θ (θ) ⇒ θq(θ) − λq 2 (θ) − p(θ) ≥ θq(θ) − λq 2 (θ) − p(θ) (A.1)
for any (θ,θ) ∈ [θ,θ] × [θ,θ] . Similarly, for a consumer of typeθ, it must be true that declaring herself to be of type θ would result in lower utility for her. Corresponding to Equation (A.1), we get Further, incentive compatibility also implies that truthful revelation of one's type would result in utility maximization. Thus, for a consumer of type θ, it must be that dU θ (θ)/dθ|θ θ 0 because of the appropriate first-order conditions. This is simplified as θq (θ) − 2λq(θ)q (θ) − p (θ) 0. (A.5)
For Equation (A.5) to be meaningful, the utility function U θ (θ) must also satisfy the second-order condition, i.e., Substituting from Equation (A.7) in (A.6) we obtain q (θ) ≥ 0. From Equation (A.4), we know that this condition is required for truth revelation. Thus, the second-order conditions do not impose any further constraints. For local ICs to satisfy globally, we need that the crossing property or SpenceMirrlees condition to be satisfied. Since, the cross-derivative (∂ 2 U(q, p, θ)/∂q∂θ ∂(θ − 2λq)/∂θ 1) has a constant sign, the requisite conditions are met.
Next, we simplify the objective function utilizing the conditions imposed by the incentive compatibility (IC) constraint and expressed in Equation (A.5). Note that U(θ) θq(θ) − λq 2 (θ) − p(θ). At this point, we ignore the constraints and do an unconstrained optimization. We later check that the constraints are satisfied. By employing pointwise maximization, we need to only maximize the integrand with respect to q(θ). This gives q * (θ) θ − (1 − F(θ))/ f (θ) 2λ (A.14)
We can now analyze the quality menu used to serve the market using Equation (A.14). Further, the quality being served increases with the consumer index until the highest possible qualityq is reached (since (1 − F(θ))/ f (θ) is decreasing in θ). Hence, q * (θ) is increasing in θ, which is exactly what we need to satisfy the constraint specified in Equation (A.4).
Note that the marginal consumer who is served gets a quality of 0. Let this consumer be indexed by θ * L . Then we have
The solution to the above equation, θ * L , provides the index of the lowest type of consumer who is served. Let the index of the lowest consumer type who is served with full quality be θ * H . This point is the solution to Substituting dθ
